Constitution Party of Pennsylv v. Pedro Cortes by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-2-2016 
Constitution Party of Pennsylv v. Pedro Cortes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Constitution Party of Pennsylv v. Pedro Cortes" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 552. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/552 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                            
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3046 
_____________ 
 
THE CONSTITUTION PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
THE GREEN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA;  
JOE MURPHY; JAMES N. CLYMER;  
CARL J. ROMANELLI; THOMAS R. STEVENS;  
KEN KRAWCHUK 
 
v. 
 
*PEDRO A. CORTES;  
JONATHAN M. MARKS, 
       Appellants 
 
     *(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.)  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 5-12-cv-02726 
District Judge: The Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
 
Argued April 13, 2016 
  
2 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 2, 2016) 
 
James N. Clymer 
Clymer Musser Brown & Conrad 
408 West Chestnut Street 
Lancaster, PA  17603 
 
Oliver B. Hall (Argued) 
Center for Competitive Democracy 
1835 16th Street N.W. 
Washington, DC  20009  
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
Kevin R. Bradford 
Claudia M. Tesoro (Argued) 
Office of Attorney General 
 of Pennsylvania  
21 South 12th Street 
Philadelphia, PA  19107 
 
Sean A. Kirkpatrick 
Office of Attorney General  
  of Pennsylvania 
Strawberry Square 
16th Floor  
Harrisburg, PA  17120 
  
3 
 
 
Gregory R. Neuhauser 
Office of Attorney General  
  of Pennsylvania 
Strawberry Square 
15th Floor 
Harrisburg, PA  17120 
 
Sarah C. Yerger 
Post & Schell 
17 North 2nd Street 
12th Floor  
Harrisburg, PA  17101 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 While the outcome of this case may yield major 
consequences, we are, as the Commonwealth concedes, 
confronted with two “relatively narrow” and “more 
technical issues” on appeal.  Appellants’ Br. 3.  This 
lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of two provisions 
of Pennsylvania’s election code: 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
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§§ 2911(b) and 2937.  These provisions, respectively, (1) 
regulate the number of signatures required to attain a 
position on the general election ballot and (2) govern the 
process by which private individuals can sue in the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to challenge the 
validity of a candidate’s nomination paper or petition.  At 
the summary judgment stage, the District Court held that, 
acting in combination, the two statutory provisions as 
applied to the Appellees violated their First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Yet on appeal the 
Commonwealth challenges only two technical issues on 
which it believes it can prevail, even “assuming some 
constitutional injury.”  Appellants’ Br. 3.  First, the 
Commonwealth argues that neither state official sued 
here has a sufficient connection to the challenged code 
provisions to be a proper defendant.  Second, it argues 
that the District Court’s order was “incoherent on its 
face,” id. at 36, and thus provided no practical benefit to 
the Appellees.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
reject both arguments and will affirm the District Court’s 
order. 
I. 
 The Appellees in this case are the Constitution 
Party of Pennsylvania, the Green Party of Pennsylvania, 
and the Libertarian Party of Pennsylvania; their 
respective chairmen—Joe Murphy, Carl Romanelli, and 
Thomas Robert Stevens; James Clymer, a member of the 
Constitution Party; and Ken Krawchuk, a former 
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Libertarian Party candidate for the U.S. Senate.  For ease 
of reference and consistency with our earlier opinion in 
this case, we will refer to the Appellees collectively as 
the “Aspiring Parties.”1  They filed suit against the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pedro 
Cortes, and the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania 
Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation, 
Jonathan M. Marks (collectively, the “Commonwealth” 
or the “officials”) in their official capacities.  
                                                 
1 As we previously noted,  
Despite referring to themselves as the 
“Minor Parties,” the organizational 
Appell[ees] are in fact not minor parties but 
are “political bodies” for purposes of the 
election code.  . . .  The term “party” also 
has an equivocal character, indicating both a 
political party and a litigant in a lawsuit.  
Thus, we have created our own term.  We 
use it only to capture the idea that both the 
individual Appell[ees] and the 
organizational Appell[ees] aspire to full 
political participation. 
Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 350 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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A. 2 
 In order to fully understand this appeal, it is 
necessary to provide some background regarding 
Pennsylvania’s election code.  To begin, the code 
distinguishes between “political parties” and “political 
bodies.”  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2831.  An organization 
qualifies as a “political party” if, during the most recent 
general election, one of its candidates polled at least two 
percent “of the largest entire vote cast” in each of at least 
ten counties and “polled a total vote in the State equal to 
at least two per centum of the largest entire vote cast in 
the State for any elected candidate.”  Id. § 2831(a).  
Political parties may then be categorized as either major 
or minor parties.  Id. § 2872.2(a); Rogers v. Corbett, 468 
F.3d 188, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2006).  Minor parties are 
defined as parties receiving less than fifteen percent of 
the total statewide registration for all political parties, 25 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2872.2(a), while parties with more 
support, at present only the Democratic and Republican 
Parties, are deemed major parties, Rogers, 468 F.3d at 
191.  “Political bodies” are organizations that did not 
have a candidate who crossed the two-percent threshold 
in the last election, and so they do not qualify for the 
benefits of being either a minor or a major party.  25 Pa. 
                                                 
2 We borrow much of Part I.A from our earlier opinion in 
this case as the facts underlying this appeal are identical 
to those previously discussed.  See id. at 350-55. 
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Stat. Ann. § 2831. 
 Major parties have the benefit of a publicly funded 
primary process through which the field of candidates is 
winnowed down and a party representative is chosen for 
the general election.  See id. § 2862; Rogers, 468 F.3d at 
191.  To be placed on the primary ballot, a major party 
candidate needs only to gather, at most, 2,000 signatures.  
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2872.1.  Minor parties and political 
bodies (together, “non-major parties”), however, have to 
put on a much larger signature-gathering campaign to 
have their nominees appear on the general election ballot.  
For statewide office in 2016, for example, a non-major 
party candidate would need to gather 21,775 signatures.3  
Appellees’ March 1, 2016 Rule 28(j) letter at 2.  After 
collecting these signatures, non-major party candidates 
are also required to file a nomination paper with the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth.  See id. §§ 2872.2 
(“Nominations by minor political parties”), 2911 
(“Nominations by political bodies”); Rogers, 468 F.3d at 
191.  The nomination paper is then examined by the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, who must reject the 
                                                 
3 This number is calculated according to 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2911(b), which requires a nomination paper for a 
statewide office to include valid signatures equal to two 
percent of the vote total of the candidate with the largest 
number of votes for any statewide office in the previous 
election. 
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filing of any submission containing “material errors or 
defects apparent on [its] face . . . or on the face of the 
appended or accompanying affidavits; or . . . contain[ing] 
material alterations made after signing without the 
consent of the signers; or . . . not contain[ing] a sufficient 
number of signatures.”  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2936. 
 Even after being received and filed by the 
Secretary, however, the nomination paper can be 
subjected to further examination if an individual lodges 
an objection within seven days of its acceptance and 
seeks to set aside the nomination paper.4  Id. § 2937.  If 
any objections are filed pursuant to § 2937, the 
Commonwealth Court reviews and holds a hearing on the 
objections and determines whether the candidate’s name 
will be placed on the ballot.  Id.  If an objection is 
successful and a nomination petition or paper is 
dismissed, “the court shall make such order as to the 
payment of the costs of the proceedings, including 
witness fees, as it shall deem just.”  Id. 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, 
under § 2937, “an award of costs . . . is not warranted 
solely on the basis that the party prevailed”; there must 
                                                 
4 While not always used consistently, under the election 
code only major party candidates file “petitions” while 
candidates of non-major parties file “papers.”  Aichele, 
757 F.3d at 351 n.5. 
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be some further reason, and it is an abuse of discretion 
for a lower court to award such costs “without identifying 
any reason specific to [the] case or . . . why justice would 
demand shifting costs to them.”  In re Farnese, 17 A.3d 
357, 369-70 (Pa. 2011).  At the same time, however, the 
court held that, while “fraud, bad faith, or gross 
misconduct . . . may require an award of costs,” “a 
party’s conduct need not proceed to such an extreme 
before” costs can be shifted.  Id. at 372.  Thus, under 
§ 2937, costs may be awarded to the person opposing 
nomination papers if there is some showing that it would 
be “just” to do so, despite the absence of “fraud, bad 
faith, or gross misconduct” on the part of the candidate 
whose nomination paper was challenged.  Id. 
 In 2004, independent presidential candidate Ralph 
Nader and his running mate were ordered to pay 
$81,102.19 in costs under § 2937, following a court 
determination that their Pennsylvania “signature-
gathering campaign involved fraud and deception of 
massive proportions.”  In re Nader, 905 A.2d 450, 455, 
460 (Pa. 2006).  That ruling appears to mark the first time 
costs were ever imposed pursuant to § 2937, and the 
reverberations from that decision have been significant. 
 According to the Aspiring Parties, the Nader 
decision transformed how § 2937 was understood and 
applied across the Commonwealth.  They claim that the 
threat of extraordinary costs “caused several minor party 
candidates either to withhold or withdraw their 
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nomination petitions” during the 2006 election cycle.  
Appellees’ Br. at 8.  For example, Appellant Krawchuk 
previously stated that, although the Libertarian Party 
nominated him as its candidate for United States Senate 
in 2006, he declined to run “due to the fact that . . . Ralph 
Nader and his running mate . . . had recently been 
ordered to pay $81,102.19.”  Constitution Party of Pa. v. 
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2014).  Thus, 
according to the Aspiring Parties, in 2006 “only one 
minor party candidate [ran] for statewide office”: 
Appellant Romanelli, the Green Party’s nominee for 
United States Senate.  Id. 
 As required by § 2911, Romanelli had to obtain 
67,070 valid signatures to get on the ballot in 2006.  He 
submitted 93,829 signatures but was removed from the 
ballot after private parties affiliated with the Democratic 
Party filed a successful objection pursuant to § 2937.  
Romanelli was then ordered to pay costs totaling 
$80,407.56.  In re Nomination Papers of Rogers, 942 
A.2d 915, 930 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).  The 
Commonwealth Court found that costs were warranted 
due to the failure of both Romanelli’s campaign and the 
Green Party to comply with certain court orders, 
including an order to provide nine people to assist in the 
review of the nominating signatures and an order to 
timely provide the court with the “specifics of what 
stipulated invalid signatures [Romanelli] believed could 
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be rehabilitated.”  Id. at 929.5 
B. 
 Over the course of the next several election cycles, 
the effect of the Nader decision continued to deter 
Aspiring Party candidates from entering the political 
fray.  Aichele, 757 F.3d at 355.  Indeed, as discussed at 
length in Aichele, the challenge process was allegedly 
being used by “allies” of the major parties to scare off 
minor party candidates with “threats of financial ruin.”  
Id. at 354.  This was not an empty threat; the cost of 
reviewing thousands upon thousands of signatures made 
many potential non-major party candidates unwilling to 
run.  In 2010 not a single candidate, other than the 
Democratic and Republican nominees, appeared on a 
statewide ballot. 
 Recognizing this shift in the political calculus 
following Nader, the Aspiring Parties filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 on May 17, 2012, against the 
Commonwealth.  They claimed that, as a result of the 
increasing imposition of costs on non-major party 
                                                 
5 Because the challenge to Romanelli’s candidacy in 
2006 was successful, under 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2831(a), 
none of the Aspiring Parties qualified as minor parties 
leading up to the 2008 election.  They were thus 
reclassified as political bodies. 
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candidates, §§ 2911(b)6 and 29377 (together, the 
“provisions”) worked in combination to violate their First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Specifically, they 
alleged that the provisions required them to assume the 
risk of incurring “substantial financial burdens . . . if they 
defend nomination petitions they are required by law to 
submit.”  Compl. 17.  In response, the Commonwealth 
filed a motion to dismiss this case under Rule 12(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the District 
Court granted for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1).  
The Aspiring Parties timely appealed that determination, 
and we reversed, holding that the Aspiring Parties had 
                                                 
6 The statute provides in relevant part: “Where the 
nomination is for any office to be filled by the electors of 
the State at large, the number of qualified electors of the 
State signing such nomination paper shall be at least 
equal to two per centum of the largest entire vote cast for 
any elected candidate in the State at large at the last 
preceding election at which State-wide candidates were 
voted for . . . .”  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2911(b). 
7 The statute provides in relevant part: “All nomination 
petitions and papers received and filed within the periods 
limited by this act shall be deemed to be valid, unless, 
within seven days after the last day for filing said 
nomination petition or paper, a petition is presented to 
the court specifically setting forth the objections thereto, 
and praying that the said petition or paper be set aside.”  
25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2937. 
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standing.  Aichele, 757 F.3d at 368. 
 The case was thus remanded to the District Court, 
which entertained cross-motions for summary judgment 
on the Aspiring Parties’ request for a declaratory 
judgment that the provisions violated their constitutional 
rights.8  In their motion for summary judgment, the 
Aspiring Parties argued that, even if the signature 
requirement alone was facially constitutional,9 the two 
provisions worked in combination to unconstitutionally 
burden their constitutional rights.  The Aspiring Parties 
explained that even though there were no direct costs 
associated with securing a spot on the ballot, the joint 
effect of §§ 2911(b) and 2937 essentially created an 
implicit ballot-access fee that was part of a “patently 
exclusionary” system in which non-major parties or their 
candidates would, almost without fail, be forced to spend 
upwards of $50,000 to defend a nomination paper.  The 
Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes, 116 F. 
Supp. 3d 486, 502-03 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (estimating a 
                                                 
8 The Aspiring Parties also argued that § 2937 was 
facially unconstitutional, but the District Court disagreed 
and held in favor of the Commonwealth on this claim.  
This issue was not appealed by the Aspiring Parties and 
is therefore not before us. 
9 Indeed, this Court has previously upheld the facial 
validity of the signature requirement in Rogers v. 
Corbett, 468 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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$50,000 cost for candidates defending a § 2937 challenge 
arising from the Commonwealth Court ordering such 
candidates to provide temporary employees to jointly 
review signatures with the challenger before the court 
would itself review the signatures that remained in 
dispute).  This figure also did not include the potential 
added liability if costs were assessed by the 
Commonwealth Court.  This added liability could bring 
the total cost to over $130,000 per candidate per election.  
Id. at 502. 
 The District Court considered these claims and 
held in a well-reasoned opinion that “the near certainty of 
incurring costs pursuant to § 2937 brings the facts of this 
case in line with” prior precedent holding that “patently 
exclusionary” fees were unconstitutional absent 
alternative means of ballot access.  Id. at 501-03.  The 
District Court then noted that “[t]he typical alternative to 
onerous ballot access costs” was a higher signature 
requirement—something already in place in addition to 
the onerous costs associated with a non-major party bid 
for a statewide office.  Id. at 503.  It then concluded that 
“the combined effect of the signature requirement with 
Section 2937’s signature validation procedures” 
substantially burdened the Aspiring Parties’ associational 
rights, and held both provisions unconstitutional as 
applied.  Id. 
 In addition, the District Court explained that the 
Commonwealth’s attempt to rely on Rogers—our earlier 
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opinion holding that § 2911(b)’s signature requirement is 
facially constitutional—was misplaced.  Even though the 
signature requirement was facially valid, the District 
Court noted, this did not prevent it from finding the 
requirement unconstitutional as applied in combination 
with § 2937.  Id. at 505.  As the District Court made 
clear, it is not solely the signature requirement nor solely 
the challenge provision that creates the unconstitutional 
burden on the Aspiring Parties; it is the interaction of 
both provisions that causes problems.  Thus, as the 
District Court explained in a footnote, its holding should 
not be read to facially invalidate § 2911(b).  Id. at 508 
n.38.  The District Court granted the Aspiring Parties’ 
motion for summary judgment on their as-applied 
challenge to §§ 2911(b) and 2937, but granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Commonwealth on the Aspiring 
Parties’ facial challenge to § 2937.  Id. at 511.  The 
Commonwealth timely appealed this order regarding the 
as-applied unconstitutionality of both provisions, but the 
Aspiring Parties chose not to appeal the determination 
that § 2937 is facially valid.10   
                                                 
10 The Aspiring Parties filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  The District Court therefore exercised subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s 
final decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II. 
 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, our standard of review is plenary.  Belitskus v. 
Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 639 (3d Cir. 2003).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 639. 
 The Commonwealth begins by asserting that, 
“even assuming some constitutional injury,” the District 
Court’s order in this case should be reversed.  
Appellants’ Br. at 3.  The Commonwealth then makes 
only two arguments in its briefing, neither of which 
addresses the substance of the District Court’s ruling on 
the as-applied challenge.  First, the Commonwealth 
claims that neither official has a sufficient connection to 
the challenged provisions to be a proper defendant here.  
Second, it argues that the District Court’s declaratory 
judgment order holding the provisions unconstitutional 
as applied but upholding them on their face is 
nonsensical and thus provides no practical benefit to the 
Aspiring Parties.  As the Commonwealth attempts to 
wryly put it,  “[i]n other words, § 2911(b) is 
constitutional, except that it isn’t.”  Id. at 37.  Because 
the Commonwealth chose not to raise any other issues on 
appeal, we must limit our analysis to these two issues, 
deeming waived any argument that the provisions, as 
applied in combination to the Aspiring Parties, do not 
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actually violate their constitutional rights. 11 
                                                 
11 In its opening brief, the Commonwealth notes that 
“[t]he legal rub here is that, even assuming some 
constitutional injury, or potential injury, has been 
inflicted on the litigants . . . that injury was not and could 
not be inflicted by the two officials they sued . . . .”  
Appellants’ Br. at 3.  The Commonwealth then makes the 
two arguments discussed above but never addresses the 
District Court’s opinion on the merits.  The Aspiring 
Parties take note of this and state that “the 
Commonwealth concedes that the challenged statutory 
scheme is unconstitutional as applied to the Minor 
Parties.”  Appellees’ Br. at 28.  In its reply, the 
Commonwealth argues that “[t]here was no concession.”  
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 3.  Instead, the Commonwealth 
tries to argue that somehow they were able to dodge the 
merits of this case by assuming an injury and only raising 
these narrower issues on appeal.  This displays a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the federal appellate 
process: by not challenging the merits of the District 
Court’s order, if the Commonwealth loses on the two 
arguments it raised in this appeal, the order will remain in 
effect and the Commonwealth will not be able to enforce 
both provisions against the Aspiring Parties.  Indeed, at 
oral argument the Commonwealth conceded that this was 
a conscious decision, but when asked why it chose such a 
litigation strategy, its answer was more opaque than 
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A. 
 While the Commonwealth begins by arguing that 
neither official sued here has any connection to the 
challenged provisions, we believe the appropriate place 
to begin is with its second argument: that the District 
Court’s declaratory judgment provided no practical 
benefit to the Aspiring Parties. 
 This is the case, the Commonwealth argues, 
because, “with all due respect to the district court, [its 
opinion is] incoherent on its face.”  Id. at 36.  As further 
evidence of what appears to be some serious confusion 
on the part of the Commonwealth, it then asks, “[s]o 
exactly what did the district court ‘declare’ and, more 
important, what are [the officials] supposed to do in the 
wake of the declaratory judgment against them?”  Id. at 
37.  The Commonwealth does correctly note that the 
challenged provisions “remain part of the Election 
Code,” but then concludes that, as a result, the officials 
cannot “protect the [Aspiring] Parties from the operation 
of 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2937” because “[t]hey have no 
ability to prevent private parties from invoking that 
statutory provision to challenge the nomination papers.”  
Id. at 37-38. 
 This argument shows that the Commonwealth fails 
                                                                                                             
illuminating.  See Oral Argument at 00:10:20, Cortes v. 
Constitution Party of Pa., (No. 15-3046). 
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to appreciate the difference between a facial and an as-
applied challenge.  “The distinction between facial and 
as-applied challenges . . . goes to the breadth of the 
remedy employed by the Court.”  Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010).  That is, 
“[a]n ‘as applied’ challenge is a claim that the operation 
of a statute is unconstitutional in a particular case while a 
facial challenge indicates that the statute may rarely or 
never be constitutionally applied.”  16 C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 243; see also United States v. Huet, 
665 F.3d 588, 600-01 (3d Cir. 2012) (same); United 
States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(same).  Here, the District Court held that in many 
situations the challenged election laws are constitutional; 
it is only when they are applied to certain non-major 
parties that the two provisions work in tandem to deprive 
these groups of their constitutionally protected rights 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.12  
Accordingly, even though the provisions remain “on the 
                                                 
12 In other words, the District Court found that, even 
though § 2937 applies to major and minor parties, “there 
is no evidence that Section 2937 is having any impact on 
the speech of major parties or their candidates.”  The 
Constitution Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 116 F. Supp. 3d 486, 
509 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  Thus, because the statute is not 
unconstitutional in the large majority of its applications, 
it is not facially invalid.  See United States v. Marcavage, 
609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010). 
  
20 
 
books,” they cannot both be enforced against the 
Aspiring Parties as a result of the District Court’s 
ruling.13   
 To accept this reasoning would mean that there is 
no mechanism in place that would allow private parties to 
bring a challenge under § 2937 against the Aspiring 
Parties.  The Commonwealth is therefore wrong that the 
signature requirement can be enforced against the 
Aspiring Parties in the form of a private suit brought 
pursuant to an unconstitutional provision of 
Pennsylvania’s election code.  Indeed, the 
Commonwealth in its reply brief seems to acknowledge 
as much, noting that “[i]f [the Aspiring Parties] were not 
required to file nomination papers [under § 2911(b)], 
there would not be anything for anyone to challenge . . . 
.”14  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 7.  As the Commonwealth 
                                                 
13 We express no view as to whether the Commonwealth 
could constitutionally enforce only one of the two 
provisions against the Aspiring Parties.  We are not 
confronted with that issue here and need not reach it. 
14 The Commonwealth does try to argue, unpersuasively, 
that any challenge to the signature requirement is 
foreclosed by our earlier decision in Rogers v. Corbett, 
468 F.3d at 188, which upheld the facial validity of the 
Commonwealth’s signature requirement.  Rogers, 
however, was distinguished at every point in this 
litigation because the challenge here is not just to the 
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further points out, “it is certainly true that but for the 
signature requirement there would be no private-party 
challenges to those signatures; and but for those 
challenges there would be no costs associated with 
defending the challenges.”  Id. at 15.  This demonstrates 
just how the relief granted here provides a practical 
benefit to the Aspiring Parties: the Commonwealth may 
not enforce both § 2911(b) and § 2937 together against 
the Aspiring Parties. 
 Seen in this light, it is readily apparent that the 
District Court’s order was not incoherent on its face and 
indeed provides the Aspiring Parties with a very practical 
benefit.  As we held in Aichele, “[i]f the Commonwealth 
officials do not enforce the election provisions at issue, 
then the Aspiring Parties will not be burdened by the 
nomination scheme embodied in §§ 2911(b) and 2937.”  
                                                                                                             
signature requirement.  Rather, as has been said 
repeatedly, the challenge here is to the signature 
requirement as applied in combination with the challenge 
requirements allowing private actors to object to 
nomination papers.  This is what caused the alleged 
injury here.  Cf. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 
(1974) (“[A] number of facially valid provisions of 
election laws may operate in tandem to produce 
impermissible barriers to constitutional rights.”). 
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757 F.3d at 368.15 
B. 
 The Commonwealth also argues that the District 
Court erred because the two state officials sued in this 
case had no connection to the enforcement of the 
provisions causing harm to the Aspiring Parties, and thus 
were improper defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts that the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth and its Commissioner of 
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and 
Legislation are simply “some hapless state official[s] 
who [are] at best . . . bystander[s].”  Appellants’ Br. at 
33. 
 As we have held on multiple occasions, while suits 
against a non-consenting State are barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment,  a party can sue a state official under Ex 
Parte Young for acting in violation of a federal law or the 
Constitution: 
The theory behind Young is that a suit to halt 
the enforcement of a state law in conflict 
with the federal constitution is an action 
against the individual officer charged with 
                                                 
15 While this language was in reference to redressability 
for purposes of standing, its reasoning is certainly 
persuasive. 
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that enforcement and ceases to be an action 
against the state to which sovereign 
immunity extends; the officer is stripped of 
his official or representative character and 
becomes subject to the consequences of his 
individual conduct. 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 506 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Such a suit, however, cannot simply seek 
to make the state officials  “representative[s] of the 
state.”  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908).  
Instead, “[i]n making an officer of the state a party 
defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act 
alleged to be unconstitutional, it is plain that such officer 
must have some connection with the enforcement of the 
act.”  Id.  That said, we have held that even “entirely 
ministerial” duties can be sufficient under Young, 
because “the inquiry is not into the nature of an official’s 
duties but into the effect of the official’s performance of 
his duties on the plaintiff’s rights.”  Finberg v. Sullivan, 
634 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 More specifically, this case was brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which allows an individual to bring suit 
against a state official who is acting “under color of state 
law”—a requirement that parallels the “state action” 
requirement elucidated in Ex parte Young actions brought 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Am. 
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49 & n.8 
(citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 
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n.18 (1982)).  Despite the Commonwealth’s arguments to 
the contrary, the Supreme Court’s holding in American 
Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), makes 
clear that a § 1983 claim challenging the combined effect 
of ballot access provisions is properly brought against a 
state’s election official, such as the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.  Id. at 779 (reviewing minor political 
parties’ § 1983 claim for declaratory and injunctive relief 
brought against the Texas Secretary of State challenging 
“various aspects of the Texas ballot qualification 
system as they interact with each other”) (emphasis 
added).   
 Our case law likewise supports the notion that the 
Appellants in this case play a sufficient role in 
administering § 2911(b) and other ballot-access 
provisions to be named as the defendants in Appellees’ 
§1983 suit.  See Rogers, 468 F.3d at 190 (considering the 
facial constitutionality of § 2911(b) in a § 1983 suit 
brought against Secretary Cortes himself); Belitskus, 343 
F.3d at 638 (reviewing the merits of a § 1983 suit against 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Election 
Commissioner challenging filing fees associated with 
accessing the Pennsylvania ballot, noting that the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth “is responsible for 
overseeing various aspects of the Commonwealth’s 
election process, including receipt of candidates’ 
nomination petitions and filing fees” and that the 
Election Commissioner “has administrative responsibility 
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for various aspects of the election process, including 
ballot access”). While Appellees’ suit challenges the 
combined effect of § 2911(b) and § 2937, it appears clear 
that, based on our own jurisprudence, § 2911(b) is 
sufficient to bring the named defendants into this suit. 
 Despite the clear history of allowing § 1983 suits 
to proceed against election officials in cases similar to 
this one, the Commonwealth attempts to pin blame for 
the harm to the Aspiring Parties on everyone except the 
officials who were sued.  First, the Commonwealth 
claims that it is the Commonwealth Court that 
adjudicates the disputes, “without the involvement of 
executive branch officials.”  Appellants’ Br. at 31.  The 
Commonwealth then argues that it is not actually the 
Commonwealth Court, but the individual challengers 
suing under § 2937 who cause injury to the Aspiring 
Parties.  Thus, according to the Commonwealth, because 
“neither [the] Commonwealth Court nor private parties 
are obliged to follow the district court’s decision,” 
“Secretary Cortes and Commissioner Marks [cannot] 
protect the [Aspiring] Parties from the operation of 25 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2937.”  This is because they have “no 
ability” to prevent private suit under the statute or to 
prevent how the Commonwealth Court will rule on the 
challenge.  Id. at 37-38. 
 This argument falls apart once one properly 
understands the District Court’s opinion.  The 
Commonwealth seems to believe that, because both 
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provisions are facially constitutional, the Aspiring Parties 
still have to gather signatures and submit them for review 
by the Commonwealth.16  This argument, again, 
misunderstands the fundamental difference between 
facial and as-applied challenges.  As discussed above, the 
District Court’s order prevents the Commonwealth from 
enforcing the two provisions together against the 
Aspiring Parties.  Thus, the Aspiring Parties cannot be 
forced to both collect the number of signatures required 
under § 2911(b) and defend those signatures in the 
§ 2937 challenge process.  Once viewed in this way, the 
argument that the two officials sued here have no 
connection to these election code provisions is, to say the 
least, off the mark. 
 Indeed, the very actions of the two officials in this 
case show how incongruous the Commonwealth’s 
position is.  As brought to our attention by the Aspiring 
Parties in a Rule 28(j) letter, the Commonwealth’s 
Department of State sent a letter to the Aspiring Parties 
explaining that, under § 2911(b), all political body 
candidates for statewide office must collect 21,775 
                                                 
16 In addition, at oral argument, the Commonwealth 
admitted that, administratively, the officials sued here 
were responsible for “preparing the ballots” and thus 
listing who is eligible as a candidate in that election.  
Oral Argument at 00:7:05, Cortes v. Constitution Party 
of Pa., (No. 15-3046). 
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signatures in 2016.  The letter then explained that 
because “[n]o court has issued any decision altering the 
duty of candidates to comply with 25 P.S. § 2911(b),” 
both Secretary Cortes and Commissioner Marks “are 
obligated to follow 25 P.S. § 2911(b) as usual and intend 
to do so in 2016.”  The clear import of this letter is that 
the two named officials plan to enforce §§ 2911(b) and 
2937 against the Aspiring Parties in 2016.  While this 
would be in clear violation of the District Court’s order 
for the reasons discussed above, the letter on its face also 
refutes the claim that neither official has any connection 
to the enforcement of the challenged provisions.17 
 Even putting aside the admissions of the 
Commonwealth, Pennsylvania’s election code is replete 
with provisions discussing the role Secretary Cortes plays 
in administering it.  Section 2911(b), for example, vests 
in the Secretary the statutory duty to “receive and 
determine, as herein provided, the sufficiency” of 
nomination papers.  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2621(d); id. 
§ 2911(b).  Indeed, according to the code, “[w]hen any 
nomination petition, nomination certificate or nomination 
paper is presented in the office of the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth or of any county board of elections for 
                                                 
17 When pressed at oral argument, the Commonwealth 
also admitted that the two officials here have a role to 
play in enforcing § 2911(b).  Oral Argument at 00:01:20, 
Cortes v. Constitution Party of Pa., (No. 15-3046). 
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filing . . . , it shall be the duty of the said officer or board 
to examine the same.”  Id. § 2936.  Further, as we noted 
in Aichele, “[t]o appear on the general election ballot, 
minor parties and political bodies are required to file 
nomination papers with the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth.”  757 F.3d at 351 (emphasis added).  In 
addition, it is up to the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
to determine “which organizations are political parties 
within the State.”  25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2861.  Moreover, 
under § 2865, the Secretary of the Commonwealth is in 
charge of “designating all the offices for which 
candidates are to be nominated therein.”  These statutory 
requirements clearly illustrate the necessary connection 
between the challenged statutory scheme and the 
officials.18  Finally, § 2937 itself also refers to the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, requiring him to open 
his office on the last day available for candidates to 
                                                 
18 If this were not enough, the Commonwealth’s website 
also explains that Commissioner Marks “will oversee the 
administration of the Elections, Notaries Public, 
Commissions and Legislation programs.  He is also 
responsible for planning, developing and coordinating 
statewide implementation of the Election Code.”  
Pennsylvania Department of State, 
http://www.dos.pa.gov/about-us/Pages/Commissioner,-
Bureau-of-Commissions,-Elections,-and-
Legislation.aspx#.VugKoOIrKig (last visited April 18, 
2016). 
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withdraw their nomination petitions or for objections to 
nomination petitions to be filed; while this reference does 
not bestow upon the Secretary an active role in the 
challenge process, it certainly creates at least a minor 
administrative role in the challenge process and indicates 
that, by virtue of his other duties, the Secretary is bound 
up in the § 2937 challenge process. 
 Furthermore, we have already addressed the 
Commonwealth’s related claim that proper defendants in 
this case are the individual citizens challenging 
nomination papers under § 2937.  In Aichele, we held 
regarding standing that “[t]he Commonwealth cannot 
hide behind the behavior of third parties when its 
officials are responsible for administering the election 
code that empowers those third parties to have the 
pernicious influence alleged in the Complaint.”  757 F.3d 
at 367.  Indeed, we went on to note that “[i]f the 
Commonwealth officials do not enforce the election 
provisions at issue, then the Aspiring Parties will not be 
burdened by the nomination scheme embodied in 
§§ 2911(b) and 2937, allowing the [Aspiring] Parties’ 
candidates to run for office and build functioning 
political parties.”  Id. at 368. 
 Finally, we note that the Commonwealth’s attempt 
to separate the two challenged provisions, and thus 
disclaim responsibility for administering § 2937, also 
fails.  Permitting such a fragmentation of the Aspiring 
Parties’ claims would prevent meaningful review of the 
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real harm caused by the statutory scheme in place here.  
See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 (1974) (“[A] 
number of facially valid provisions of election laws may 
operate in tandem to produce impermissible barriers to 
constitutional rights.”); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
34 (1968) (looking at the “totality” of Ohio’s election 
laws when determining whether they are 
unconstitutional).  We therefore hold that both officials 
sued by the Aspiring Parties had a sufficient connection 
to the enforcement of the challenged provisions as 
required under Ex Parte Young. 
C. 
 Our holding, of course, does not prevent the 
legislature from amending its election code to create new, 
constitutional, provisions that regulate access to the 
general election ballot.  Nor do we express any view as to 
whether the Commonwealth could choose to enforce only 
one or the other provision against the Aspiring Parties.  
We simply hold that what the Commonwealth cannot do 
is avoid the clear import of the District Court’s order in 
this case: that §§ 2911(b) and 2937, when enforced 
together, are unconstitutional as applied to the Aspiring 
Parties. 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order granting summary judgment on 
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Counts I and II in favor of the Aspiring Parties. 
 
